Topics and approaches to studying intelligence

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List of acronyms

AI	Artificial Intelligence
CAP	Career Analyst Program
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central intelligence Agency
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCID	Director of Central Intelligence Directive
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IC	Intelligence Community
ICD	Intelligence Community Directive
IRTPA	Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
KGB	Soviet Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security
MAPS	Membership Action Plans
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NPT	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NSA	National Security Agency
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OPID	Official public intelligence disclosure
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
POA	Program of Analysis
SAT	Structured Analytic Technique
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WWII	World War II
WWW	World Wide Web

Preface

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Our goal in constructing *Topics and Approaches to Studying Intelligence* is to bring into sharper focus the evolving nature of intelligence studies, which is in the midst of a period of significant expansion taking place across a number of dimensions. This growth builds upon the foundational concepts and topics covered in early post-WWII writings on intelligence. It also extends the range of topics covered and the approaches and concepts used in these studies. Intelligence studies have moved from being a relatively small and self-contained silo of work into one now found in the mainstream of academic and professional writings. It has also moved from a field of study composed almost exclusively of U.S., Canadian, and British authors and professionals into one with worldwide authorship. We hope that *Topics and Approaches to Studying Intelligence* will serve as a platform for extending intelligence studies even further by bringing these trends together into a single volume.

The analytical study of intelligence is but one dimension of intelligence studies, and this has always been the case. Roger Hilsman (1956) identified four distinct attitudes toward the field of intelligence: 1) operational, 2) administrative, 3) working level, and 4) academic. Harry Ransom (1980) identified four categories of intelligence writing: 1) memoirs defending the intelligence system, 2) whistle-blowing exposés of the intelligence system, 3) scholarly analysis of intelligence, and 4) government reports. In terms of quantity, for much of the period, scholarly studies of intelligence lagged behind memoirs defending the intelligence system and whistle-blowing exposés, a combination Roy Godson (1993) characterized as popular studies rather than serious studies of intelligence.

Among the earliest post-WWII contributions to the analytical study of intelligence are those by George Pettee (1946) and Sherman Kent (1949). Pettee wrote of the deficiencies of U.S. intelligence immediately preceding and during WWII. He saw intelligence as a large-scale analytic task and called for creating a permanent intelligence unit within the government that was staffed by intelligence professionals and positioned such that intelligence and policy organizations would be in a relationship of mutual guidance. Kent (1949)

argued that intelligence extended beyond providing information and giving warnings. It also involved analyzing policy problems. More was required than merely collecting data. Intelligence also entailed making projections into the future with an audience of elected officials, policy planners, and bureaucrats. In 1955, Kent would follow up his book *Strategic Intelligence* with the founding of a journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, published by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, which he hoped would help create a literature on intelligence.

 A common theme running through commentaries on the analytic study of intelligence has been that it needs strengthening. Writing in 1964, Klaus Knorr noted that there was a general lack of either a descriptive or normative theory of intelligence. Such concerns continued into the 1980s. Reviewing writings on intelligence between 1977 and 1979, Hilsman (1981) concluded that, as a group, they were disappointing and did not make a serious contribution to the study of intelligence. A few years later, Ransom (1986) asserted that the relationship between information and action "remains tentative, and secrecy of evidence remains a formidable problem." In the early 1990s, Hastedt (1991) commented on the continued heavy focus placed on U.S. intelligence systems in intelligence studies and called for a greater emphasis on comparative intelligence analysis as well as a broadening of research strategies to include quantitative analysis.

Notwithstanding these critiques, this period also saw the beginnings of a breakthrough in the study of topics and approaches in the study of intelligence with the contributions made by such authors as Christopher Andrew, Richard Betts, Michael Handel, Loch Johnson, Mark Lowenthal, Kathy Pherson, Randy Pherson, Jennifer Sims, Michael Warner, Gregory Treverton, and Roberta Wohstetter. It also saw the founding of two new intelligence journals, *Intelligence and National Security* and the *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*. A much broader and deeper field of intelligence studies exists today and has emerged from this foundation. In November 2023, an online information session of intelligence studies journal editors organized by the Intelligence Studies Consortium brought together representatives from 14 journals with editors from North America, Europe, and Australia.

Working on this foundation of past and contemporary analytic intelligence studies, the chapters in *Topics and Approaches to Studying Intelligence* highlight areas of debate and disagreement, provide insight into new areas of study, and broaden the methodological toolset used by researchers. Many of the works in the book were presented as papers at the American Political Science Association, International Association for Intelligence Education, and other academic conferences. Working with the authors, we combined these works into this edited volume.

In Chapter One, "Beyond Information: Analysis, Analysts, and Intelligence," John J. Borek examines the process of creating intelligence using the concept

of the intelligence cycle as a starting point for his analysis. He argues that the analysis is the critical component of the intelligence cycle and that the creation of intelligence is not a single transformation but a series of transformations. Borek calls for adopting a customer-analyst-centric approach as an alternative to the intelligence cycle model.

In Chapter Two, "Predicting Intelligence Alliances," Katharine Cunningham and Andrew M. Macpherson use a network science approach to predict intelligence alliances. Intelligence sharing is a critical activity that is often studied via qualitative approaches. Their novel quantitative work offers another approach to identifying intelligence alliances.

In Chapter Three, "Demystifying Private-Sector Security Intelligence Teams: Unlocking Their Value in Strategic Decision-Making," Angela Miller Lewis observes that strategic security intelligence teams have become an important part of the private-sector response to operating in the current volatile geopolitical and security environment, but they have received little attention in the intelligence studies literature. This chapter provides insight into their purpose, unique capabilities, the challenges they face, and their contributions to private-sector decision-making and risk management.

In Chapter Four, "Constructing Spies: Organizations, Gender, and Embodiment," Bridget Rose Nolan uses ethnographic data and declassified CIA documents to investigate how the gendered practices of intelligence organizations construct workers. Nolan's study illustrates that while the CIA and National Counterterrorism Center construct intelligence officers in ways that are presented as gender-neutral, they actually have gendered consequences for individual workers. Nolan calls upon the intelligence community to take steps to reorganize and rethink the workplace and its expectations of its employees more broadly.

In Chapter Five, "Analysis, Collection, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action, Oh My...: Evaluating Coverage of the Intelligence Disciplines in Academic Journals," Doug Patteson presents the results of a survey of academic national security intelligence journals from 2001 to 2021. Intelligence articles are divided into four categories: collection, counterintelligence, covert action, and analysis. The dominant intelligence topic covered in these journals was analysis, followed by covert action. Understudied is collection. Patteson concludes that broadening the literature on intelligence to include more on collection is a fundamental step in increasing our overall knowledge of intelligence.

In Chapter Six, "Advancing the Intelligence Profession: The Case for Accreditation in Intelligence Studies," James D. Ramsay and Barry A. Zulauf present an argument for the standardization of college-level intelligence studies through the process of accreditation and organized around outcome-based education. Accreditation is held to be necessary to ensure that intelligence studies programs offer quality assurance, legitimacy, and professionalism. They

begin by reviewing arguments for and against doing so and then build their case around the academic and programmatic underpinnings of well-established professions such as medicine and law.

In Chapter Seven, "Official Public Intelligence Disclosure as a Tool of Foreign Policy," Ofek Riemer examines the authorized disclosure of secret intelligence information and assessments as a tool of foreign policy. He notes this is not a new development but one which is becoming increasingly prevalent. Riemer asserts that while not a silver bullet, under conditions where outright warfare has not yet broken out, official public intelligence disclosure allows a state to manipulate the decision calculus and perceptions of foreign governments and the public to obtain deterrence, compellence, and legitimacy for their foreign policy.

In Chapter Eight, "The IAEA and the Dynamics of Intelligence Sharing," Robert Reardon examines the complicated and politically sensitive process of intelligence sharing. His focus is on the three-way relationship between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.S.—upon which it is highly dependent for intelligence to carry out its mission—and the state that is the target of intelligence. Reardon outlines a framework to analyze this relationship and applies it to North Korea and Iran. His analysis sheds light on why cooperation is generally higher than expected and offers guidance for policymakers in deciding the pros and cons of sharing intelligence.

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Chapter 1

Beyond information: Analysis, analysts, and intelligence

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Abstract: John J. Borek examines the process of creating intelligence using the concept of the intelligence cycle as a starting point for his analysis. He argues that the analysis is the critical component of the intelligence cycle and that the creation of intelligence is not a single transformation but a series of transformations. Borek calls for adopting a customer-analyst- centric approach as an alternative to the intelligence cycle model.

Keywords: Alternative analysis, intelligence analysis, intelligence cycle, open source, structured analytical techniques

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Creating intelligence: Analysis and the role of analysts

As the U.S. completes its transition in national security focus from the Global War on Terrorism to an era of great power competition, there is a corresponding need for intelligence practitioners to transition the type of intelligence it provides. While "actionable intelligence," the type used to disrupt terror cells and prevent imminent attacks, will always be needed, the requirement for well-reasoned analytic forecasts looking beyond the immediate timeframe has again become necessary. In this progression of knowledge past mere information, a review of how intelligence is created and who is responsible for doing it is a necessary component of any discussion. Unfortunately, intelligence analysis—that is, "the process by which information is transformed into intelligence" (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2013b, 71)—is acknowledged to be one of the least understood and most understudied aspects of the national security intelligence enterprise (Borek 2017). A primarily cognitive function, other actants, and variables ranging from workplace policies to the types of tools

and technology available all play a role in the process, making it difficult to develop a comprehensive description of the activity.

At its core, we understand intelligence analysis to be the analysis (breaking down into components for detailed study) and synthesis (combining disparate elements into a new whole) of information in response to a question. But that merely scratches the surface of the analytic process. As we move past this macro level of understanding, we quickly recognize that analysis and the analysts that accomplish it are *the* critical components of the entire intelligence cycle, with duties and responsibilities driving the intelligence enterprise.

This chapter will approach the creation of intelligence, that is, the process of intelligence analysis, not as a single transformation but as a series of transformations, each resulting in unique products (both tangible and intangible). It will begin with a review of the intelligence cycle and present the case that the analytic component is the driving element within it, offering a customer-analyst-centric alternative to the current model. It begins with a brief discussion of the customer component of that relationship, reviewing the wide range of analysis the national security enterprise requires and continues with a discussion of the influence that post-9/11 legislation and policy had on the process. The majority of the chapter will detail the different transformations that define the analytic process and conclude with some thoughts on the future of intelligence analysis and the analytic process.

The intelligence cycle and the analyst

The use of the intelligence cycle as a model of the process of collection, analysis, and dissemination in response to customer requirements can trace its origin to the U.S. military in WWII, with roots likely further back (Wheaton 2011, January 4). It was explicitly discussed as the model of how the post-WWII intelligence community (IC) operated in the 1976 Church Committee Report, although the committee found the model "barely recognizable" when compared to actual operations (Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976, 17-19). This early description of the cycle begins with consumers first identifying the information they need, resulting in senior intelligence managers translating those needs into requirements, which are used to cue the collection system; the collected information is then turned into finished intelligence by the analysts; the finished product is then provided to the consumer, resulting in additional information needs and beginning the cycle again.

This depiction of the intelligence cycle has undergone slight modifications over the years, with categories being reworded, added, subtracted, or combined to reflect the emphasis of the agency or organization developing it.

Contributors

Dr. John Borek completed his post-doctoral fellowship in February 2023 in the Homeland Defense and Security Issues Group at the U.S. Army War College and is currently an adjunct instructor in the National Security Intelligence Analysis Program at the University of New Hampshire. He is a former Army strategic intelligence officer and served as a civilian analyst, senior analyst, and branch chief at the National Ground Intelligence Center where he was recognized for analytic excellence on four separate occasions for both individual and team production. He was certified as a Director of National Intelligence Analytic Tradecraft Standards evaluator, and is certified by both the DoD and the Intelligence Community Joint Duty Program. John received his PhD in public policy from Walden University, an MS in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University, and a BS in geography from the Pennsylvania State University.

Andrew Macpherson is an Assistant Professor of security studies at the University of New Hampshire. He is the program coordinator for the UNH master's degree in National Security Intelligence Analysis and the principal investigator for the Northeast Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence, a long-term partnership with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Dr. Angela Lewis is an adjunct professor in Georgetown University's Applied Intelligence program and in the University of Cincinnati's School of Public and International Affairs. Dr. Lewis earned her PhD at Pepperdine University, where her dissertation focused on a systems theory approach to leveraging strategic intelligence for executive decision-making in the private sector. Dr. Lewis formerly worked in both the public and private sectors, including executive-level roles in security and intelligence with Creative Artists Agency (CAA), Nisos, and Salesforce, and building and leading the strategic intelligence team at The Walt Disney Company. She also previously served as a senior targeting officer in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with multiple tours abroad.

In addition to her PhD, Dr. Lewis has an MA in international relations from American University and BAs in international relations and political science from the University of Cincinnati. She serves on the Education Committee for the Association of International Risk Intelligence Professionals (AIRIP), and she is the Private Sector Chair of the State Department's Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Regional Committee and

a Girl Security Mentor. Dr. Lewis is passionate about strategic intelligence, organizational culture, and leadership development.

Bridget Rose Nolan is an Assistant Professor of security studies at the University of New Hampshire. She completed her bachelor's degree in psychology at Princeton University and her PhD in sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research interests include organizational change and failure, intelligence analysis, international security, and diversity in government. Dr. Nolan completed a postdoctoral research fellowship at the National Security Studies Institute at the University of Texas at El Paso. She is a former counterterrorism analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Doug Patteson is an adjunct professor of intelligence studies at the University of New Hampshire. He spent a decade as an Operations Officer at the CIA. He also serves as CFO for Turbocam International, a U.S.-headquartered multinational manufacturing firm, in addition to consulting on espionage-themed film and TV projects.

James Ramsay is a Professor of security studies, and Head of the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University in Sydney Australia. Prior to this position, he was the founding coordinator of the Homeland Security program, and the founding Chair of the Department of Security Studies at the University of New Hampshire. Earlier, he had created one of the first undergraduate programs in homeland security in the U.S. at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Florida, where he also founded the Department of Security Studies and International Affairs. He has over 20 years' experience in public health, security studies, emergency management, and occupational and environmental health, building several degree programs, dozens of courses, and two departments. He has created an NSA Center of Academic Excellence in cybersecurity defense education and an ODNI CAE in intelligence education. Dr. Ramsay serves on the IAFIE board as the education practices chair, and as the editor-in-chief for the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. He also serves on the editorial boards for the Homeland Security Affairs Journal and the Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, and he co-founded and serves as associate editor for the Journal of Security, Intelligence, and Resilience Education. Dr. Ramsay's books include Environmental Security: Concepts, Challenges and Case Studies (American Meteorological Society, 2019); and Introduction to Homeland Security, Critical Issues in Homeland Security: A Casebook, and Theoretical Foundations of Homeland Security: Strategies, Operations and Structures, each published by Routledge. Dr. Ramsay was appointed by the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services to serve on the Board of Scientific Counselors to the Director of the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health in the CDC, where he served for four years.

Barry Zulauf, PhD, is the president of IAFIE. Dr. Zulauf is on the intelligence faculty of Johns Hopkins, Georgetown, James Madison, Indiana, and Mercyhurst Universities. Since August 2023, he has been the Defense Intelligence Officer for Counternarcotics, Transnational Organized Crime, and Threat Finance. He was named in June 2022 as the DNI's representative at the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, and was selected by DNI James Clapper to be the first ODNI Chair on the faculty of the National Intelligence University from 2012 to 2015.

Ofek Riemer is a postdoctoral research fellow with the Chaikin Chair for Geostrategy at the University of Haifa, and the coordinator of the Israeli Forum for Intelligence Studies (IFIS). He received his PhD from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 2022 for his work on public intelligence disclosure in international relations, which received the Israel Political Science Association Award for Best Dissertation that year. His research was published in Contemporary Security Policy, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Strategic Assessment, and War on the Rocks.

Robert J. Reardon is an Associate Professor in the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, at North Carolina State University. He is also the Director of the Master of International Studies in the School of Public and International Affairs.

Glenn P. Hastedt is a professor emeritus of the Justice Studies department at James Madison University (JMU), where he served as the chair. His publications include American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future and numerous articles on intelligence in Intelligence and National Security and the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. He is a former co-editor of the journal White House Studies. Dr. Hastedt supports the Northeast Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence.

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